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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., 
a corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING, 
a corporation, and WYOMING MINERAL 
CORPORATION, a corporation, 
De fen dan ts and 
Respondents 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
case No. 16209 
NATURE OF CASE 
A subcontractor seeks recovery for alleged cost overruns 
from the building owner, the project engineer and the general 
contractor. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted by 
the Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, on five of plaintiff's 
seven counts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek to have the summa~} judgment entered 
be low a f fi r:ned. 
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Statement of Facts 
COntractual Relations 
Wyoming Mineral (•wyoming Mineral" or "OWner") con-
tracted with u. S. Construction, Inc ("U. S. Construction") on 
February 5, 1977 and with Jacobs Engineering Company ("Jacobs 
Engineering•) on March 1, 1977 to erect the building which is 
the aubject of this suit. u.s. Construction was to do the 
concrete work and erect the building (R. 238, ex. P-52) and 
Jacobs Engineering was assigned Wyoming Mineral's rights under 
the U. S. Construction contract and was obligated, as the general 
contractor, to "do all things" necessary to complete the uranium 
extraction facility. (R. 240, ex. D-84). 
On April 11, 1977, plaintiff by and through its presider. 
William c. Howe ("Howe"), signed a subcontract with u. s. Con-
struction for erection of the building on the Wyoming Mineral 
property. (R. 237, ex. D-6). Plaintiff's work was described in 
that subcontract as the "Erection only of one (1) Butler metal 
building • " (R.237, ex. D-6, Section 2). The compensation 
to be paid plaintiff for that work was $53,372.00; with approved 
extra compensation, U. S. Construction ultimately paid or tendere: 
to plaintiff $64,193.65, of which $10,901.65 remains unpaid. (R. 
104-105). As ~s apparent from those figures, plaintiff has been 
allowed over $10,000.00 in add~tional compensation from the 
or~ginal subcontract amount. 
Relevant Contract Prov~s~ons 
Section 4 o~ ':!"le subcontract ;:no\·ides tr.at an·; i.:1crease 
1n plaint1ff's compens3t!~~ be~~~sc c~ 1 :~3~~e -·· ~~e ~~~~~ ~us~ 
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be agreed upon in writing prior to the work being performed. 
That section specifically provides that "no increase or decrease 
in the subcontract price shall be binding on the Contractor 
unless agreed upon in writing." (R. 237, ex. D-6). 
Section 6 of the subcontract provides that if the 
subcontractor is delayed by, or encounters interference from, the 
contractor, owner or other subcontractors an extension of time 
may be requested, but that the subcontractor is not: 
. . . entitled to any increase in the Sub-
contract price or to damages or additional 
compensation as a consequence of such delay 
except to the extent that Contractor is 
entitled to receive an increase in contract 
price from the Owner. (R.236, ex. D-6, 
Section 6). 
Under u. s. Construction's contract with Wyoming Mineral, 
compensation for interference from the Owner was available only 
under the following conditions: 
9. Simultaneous Work B~ Others. 
(a) ... Any cla~m of the Contractor 
arising out of any alleged interference due 
to the conduct of such other work shall be 
made to the Owner in writing within five 
(5) days of the occurrence of the alleged 
interference and shall be deemed to have been 
waived unless so made. 
(R.238, ex. D-52, General Conditions--A) 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Before signing the subcontract, Howe had read the 
agreement and understood its terms. (R. 236 at 34-37). Howe was 
aware that written authorization Kas required for extras, having 
- 3-
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bad a claia for extraa denied by u. s. Construction on a previous 
job under the same subcontract form because of that requirement. 
(a. 231 at 8-9). Nevertheless, Howe admitted a complete failure 
on plaintiff's part to comply with the subcontract provision 
~latin9 to approval of extras (R. 236 at 51): 
Q. All right. And except for those 
claims that have been made and payment 
has either been made or tendered, all of 
the other claims in your Complaint are 
for monies for work services, materials 
which were performed by you before you 
submitted a claim for extra work and had 
it approved by U. s. Construction? 
A. Yes. 
Even if plaintiff's claims are for interference, rather 
than for extra work, it is clear from a review of the invoices 
submitted by plaintiff that none were timely submitted. (R. 237, 
ex. D-9, 0-10, D-11, o-12, o-21, o-22, D-23 and D-24). Each of 
those invoices was submitted more than five days after the cause 
of the alleged interference, making it impossible for u. S. 
Construction to obtain increased compensation by forwarding the 
invoices to Wyoming Mineral and thereby rendering compensation for 
the plaintiff under the subcontract impossible. (R.23B, ex. D-52, 
General Conditions--A, ~9). 
Plaintiff's Re uests for Additional Com ensation and Acce tance 
o Payment ~n Full 
Plaintiff commenced work at the job site on June 20, 
1977, and soon thereafter submitted to l'. S. Construction ar. 
-.j-
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invoice dated June 29, 1977, for "back-charges•, totalling $4,660.00, 
including charges through June 24, 1977. (R. 236, ex. D-9). TWo 
of the items on that request were approved by u. s. Oon•truction 
and the rest were denied. (R. 236 at 55). On July 19, 1977, o. s. 
Construction tendered to plaintiff a "Waiver of Lien" (R. 237, ex. 
D-7) acknowledging full satisfaction and release of all claims for 
all materials supplied and work performed to that date and a check 
in the amount of $1,400.00 (R. 237, ex D-8) with an endorsement 
similar to the Waiver of Lien. The "Waiver of Lien" and check 
were both signed, unaltered, by an employee of plaintiff. (R. 236 
at 52-53}. 
Plaintiff submitted an invoice to u. s. Construction for 
additional compensation dated July 28, 1977, for $6,560.11. (R. 
237, ex. D-10). With the exception of two items, authorization 
for extra compensation for the items listed in that invoice, was 
neither requested nor approved in writing before the work was 
performed. (R. 236 at 58-59). The invoice related to compen-
sation for work rendered through July 15, 1977; the invoice is 
dated thirteen days later, on July 28, 1977. (R. 237, ex. D-10). 
On August 8, 1977, plaintiff again submitted an invoice to U. S. 
Construction for "Extra time (men & equipment rentals) caused by 
interferences of other trades, equipment and structures ... • 
claiming compensation totaling $6,632.64. (R. 237, ex. D-11). 
The invoice related to interference during the month of July, and 
-5-
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... tba~fo~ •ubmitted eight days after the last interference to 
wbicb the invoice related. (R.237, ex. D-11) • 1 
On Auqu8t 10, 1977, U. S. Construction delivered to 
plaintiff a check with a restrictive endorsement acknowledging 
full •ati•faction and release of all claims for services performed 
and .. terial• •upplied to that date. The check indicated that was 
payment for both the regular progress payment and "Payment of 
IXtra work at Wyoming Mineral per invoices." The check was 
accogpanied by a •waiver of Lien" form containing in substance the 
•aae language as the check endorsement. (R. 237, ex. D-13 & 14). 
Howe picked up the check and the Waiver of Lien form 
from U. S. Construction's office, altered the check endorsement to 
indicate that rather than a full, there would be only a partial 
release. (R. 236 at 63-66). Howe personally took the check to 
U. S. Construction's bank, altered the endorsement language and 
demanded a cashier's check in return. (R. 236 at 68-69). Howe 
has admitted that, despite all of the conjecture contained in 
plaintiff's brief, he did not obtain authorization for the alterat: 
in the check from any employee of u. s. Construction. (R. 236 at 
66): 
On August 8, 1977, plaintiff also requested a novation, or 
renegotiation of the subcontracts. (R. 237, ex. D-12). That 
request was in two parts: ( 1) a request for extra compensation 
through July 19, 1977, totaling $19,892.75 which, with the 
exceptions noted above, was neither timely nor approved; (2) an 
additional request of $35,173.00 in excess of the subcontract 
through completion of the job. The request was rejected. (R 
236 at 61-62). 
-6-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. All right. Did you talk to personally 
any employee of u. s. Construction Company 
to attempt to obtain authority to strike 
and interline the endorsement of the check 
shown on Exhibit D-14? 
A. No, I did not. 
Howe followed that same procedure with two subsequent checks. 
(R. 237, ex. D-15, D-30; R. 235 at 70 and 94). 
Plaintiff submitted various requests for extras, dated 
August 29 and 31 and September 6, 1977, all of which were denied. 
(R. 237, ex. D-21 through 24; R. 236 at 87). The date of each of 
those invoices was more than five days after the alleged inter-
ference to which it related. Despite this ongoing dispute as to 
the amount owed, on September 7, 1977, Howe picked up another 
check from u. S. Construction and again altered the endorsement. 
(R. 237, ex. 15: R. 236 at 79-80). 
On October 11, 1977, Howe obtained another check from U. 
S. Construction, this time from its president (R.237, ex. D-30; R. 
236 at 92). Howe did not request permission to interline changes 
in the endorsement, though he again did so. (R. 236 at 93). 
Subsequently. on November 3, 1977, a check, accompanied by a 
letter, was tendered to plaintiff, conditioned on acceptance as 
final payment (R.237, ex. D-31 & 32); plaintiff refused that 
conditional tender. (R.237, ex. D-33). 
ARGUMENT 
I. NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTS 
Plaintiff correctly cites Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure as the standard under which the trial court 
-7-
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ruled and pursuant to which this court must review the trial 
court's judgment. The trial court here had before it facts 
wbich, when examined in light of the applicable legal doctrines, 
established the defendants' right to judgment as a matter of law. 
That determination should be upheld. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court's judgment was 
t.proper because issues existed as to material facts. The facts, 
bowev.r, are simple. A dispute existed as the amounts owed under 
the subcontract, plaintiff accepted checks as payment in full and 
is now precluded from seeking more by accord and satisfaction. 
Bven without the accord and satisfaction, plaintiff's failure to 
comply with subcontract terms bars additional compensation under 
the subcontract. Recovery in unjust enrichment is inappropriate 
since there is an express contract under which the work was 
performed and which provides for compensation for the plaintiff. 
Foreclosure of plaintiff's mechanic's lien is inappro-
priate since the full subcontract amount has been paid. Finally, 
plaintiff's claim of breach of contract against Wyoming Mineral 
and Jacobs Engineering is patently absurd since plaintiff has a 
contract with neither of those parties. Each of these bases for 
the trial court's judgment must be examined and be presumed to 
be a basis for its ruling judgment. Green Witch \~ater Co. v. 
Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964); and, Waters 
v. Waters, 100 Utah 246, 113 P.2d 1038 (1941). Moreover, the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants was fully 
warranted in this case. 
-::-<-
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II. THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IS SUPPORTED BY 
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION. 
A. THE AMOUNT OWED PLAINTIFF 
UNDER ITS SUBCONTRACT IS 
UNLIQUIDATED 
On April 11, 1977, plaintiff entered a subcontract 
under which it was to perform certain labor, fully described in 
the subcontract, for $53,372.00. (R.237, ex.D-6). Soon after 
plaintiff began performance under the subcontract, plaintiff 
began to dispute the amount owed for performance of the subcontract 
work. Less than one month after the work was started, plaintiff 
submitted an invoice for "back charges" totaling $4,660.00, 
contending that the subcontract compensation should be increased 
by that amount. (R. 236, ex.D-9). U. S. Construction disputed 
that contention, on various grounds, and stated that only two of 
the items on that request would pe paid. (R. 236 at 55). 
Throughout performance of its subcontract work, plaintiff 
contended that it was entitled to extra compensation and U. S. 
Construction continued to allow some of plaintiff's claims, 
disallow others, and to tender checks for amounts less than 
plaintiff contended it was owed. A review of all of the invoices 
submitted by plaintiff, and the various responses by U. S. Con-
struction, establish that there was never an agreed upon compen-
sation, liquidated to the satisfaction of both parties, after 
work was started by plaintiff. 
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Despite the fact that there is but one subcontract 
involvad, which provides for only one compensation, plaintiff 
atteapts to sever its claims in order to argue lack of considera-
tion. Plaintiff asserts that amounts which have been paid by u. 
s. construction were liquidated and therefore provide no consider-
ation for an accord and satisfaction of plaintiff's unpaid 
claims, which plaintiff asserts are ~~liquidated. Plaintiff 
ignores one compelling, uncontroverted fact -- the present con-
troversy involves one sum, the amount which plaintiff is entitled 
to for work performed under one subcontract, which provides for 
but one total compensation. Plaintiff's claims for additional 
compensation are valid only if such claims comply with the 
subcontract. If plaintiff is entitled to that additional com-
pensation, it is because the claims comply with the contract and 
are, therefore, merely a portion of the total subcontract amount 
due. 
Plaintiff's liquidated-unliquidated distinction supposed: 
deprives the accord and satisfaction found by the trial court of 
consideration. Plaintiff's contention is supported by neither 
Utah law nor a rr.ajority of jurisdictions. Further, plaintiff's 
argument rests on the basic misconception that the amount due 
~•der the subcontract is severable into liquidated and unliqui-
dated claims. 
Under Ut.3.h law, payment by a debtor of an amount less 
than the creditor claims, where t~e amount O\ved is in dispute, 1S 
-10-
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a sufficient consideration for an accord and satisfaction. As 
stated by this court in Browning v. EqUitable Assur. Society, 94 
Utah 532, 72 P. 2d 1060 (1937): 
There must be consideration for [an accord 
and satisfaction). Settlement of an un-
liquidated or disputed claim where the 
parties are apart in good faith presents such 
consideration. 
In accord, Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 
18€. 417 P.2d 761 (1966), and Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975). Under the present 
uncontoverted facts, plaintiff claims compensation far in excess 
of the amount which U. s. Construction contends is due. Plaintiff's 
compensation under the subcontract is therefore disputed: 
A demand is necessarily either liquidated or 
unliquidated. A demand is not liquidated, or 
undisputed, even if it appears that something 
is due, unless it appears how much is due~ 
and when it is admitted that one of two 
different sums is due, but there is a genuine 
dispute as to which is the proper amount, the 
demand is unliquidated, within the meaning of 
that term as applied to accord and satisfaction. 
It may be said that the reason for the rule 
in such an instance is that a dispute as to a 
part of the debt makes thP. whole debt a 
disputed one so as to come within the general 
rule that payment of part of an unliquidated 
debt in full satisfaction thereof discharges 
the entire debt. 
Grindstaff v. North Richland Hills Corp., 343 S.W.2d 742, 745 
(Tex. App. 1961). See also, Dickson v. Stockman, 411 S.W.2d 610 
(Tex. App. 1966); Paulsen Estate v. ~aches-Selah Irr. Dist., 190 
-11-
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wash. 205 67 P.2d 856 (1937) 1 Hutchinson v. Colbertson, 161 Pa. 
Super. St. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947) 1 Hancock v. Johnson, 69 Wyo. 
503, 2•• P.2d 285 (1952). 
In its brief, plaintiff discussed cases from several 
jurisdictions and concluded that those cases supported its argu-
ment. Defendants will not discuss and distinguish all of those 
cases. Plaintiff's interpretation of those cases will effec-
tively destroy the central purpose of the doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction -- the settlement of claims. The opportunity for ~ 
accord and satisfaction arises where the parties cannot agree on 
the amount due. The debtor normally will not contend that 
nothing is due, but rather admits that some amount is due and is 
willing to tender that amount. Plaintiff would seize on that 
"admission," and conclude that if the debtor is willing to admit 
a certain sum is due, that amount is liquidated and payment of 
that amount will not constitute a consideration for an accord and 
satisfaction. According to this erroneous reasoning, whenever a 
debtor is willing to pay what it believes is due, the sum is 
liquidated, leaving an unliquidated sum to be litigated. The 
opportunity for an accord and satisfaction vanishes. 
Plaintiff errs in assuming its argued for distinction 
is a legal, as opposed to factual, finding. Situations can be 
imagined where there is an undisputed sum paid, for example for 
one parcel of goods, which is unrelated to a dispute over anot~e' 
parcel of goods. This could negate the accord and was, in fac~. 
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the factual setting of Dillman v. Massy-Ferguson, Inc., 13 Otab 
2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 (1962), cited by plaintiff. Such cases bave 
no applicability to the facts before the trial court here. 
[T)here is a dispute between the debtor and 
the creditor as to the amount due, one claiming 
that a certain sum is due and the other 
claiming that another sum is the proper 
amount, [so that) the demand is unliquidated, 
within the meaning of that term as applied to 
accord and satisfaction. 
Paulsen Estate v. Naches-Selah Irr. Dist., 190 Wash. 205, 67 
P.2d 856, 857 (1937). 
If the Washington court adhered to plaintiff's argument 
in the early Seattle R&S Ry. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma Power Co., 63 
wash. 639, 116 P.289 (1911), cited in plaintiff's brief, the rule 
has apparently changed to that stated in the Paulson Estate case. 
Although the Seattle R&S Ry· Co. case has been cited subsequently 
to the Paulsen Estate case, the cases in which it was cited are 
significantly different. In one, a debtor contended that payment 
of a liquidated account constituted an accord and satisfaction of 
a dispute which arose thereafter over another account. Moyer v. 
Stram, 37 Wash. 2d 818, 226 P.2d 218 (1951). The other case 
involved a debtor who tendered one-half of the amount he adwitted 
was due and then alleged an accord and satisfaction. Field 
Lumber Co. v. Petty, 9 Wash. App. 378, 512 P.2d 764 (1973). 
The claims which form the basis for the instant suit 
are for one amount, the amount owed under the subcontract. That 
amount was in dispute. Under such circumstances, the acceptance 
-13-
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of an amount as payment in full of that unliquidated claim is an 
accord and satisfaction supported by a valid consideration. 
None of the Utah cases cited by plaintiff support its 
contention. The first, F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 
Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670 (1965), is totally inapposite, standing 
for a proposition which defendants do not question. That case 
involved a debtor's contention that an accord and satisfaction 
had resulted from partial payments on a promissory note. The 
debtor did not dispute the amount owed on the promissory note, 
but contended that tender and acceptance of an amount less than 
the liquidated amount owed on the note constituted an accord and 
aatiefaction. This court correctly found no consideration under 
those circumstances noting, however, that: 
It is true that the modern trend is to be 
cautious about rigidly applying this rule and 
that courts are generally somewhat indulgent 
toward finding consideration somewhere in the 
new arrangement, such that it was to settle a 
dispute, or that there is some advantage to 
the creditor in accepting the lesser amount, 
where the unreasoning adherence to the rule 
might result in inequity. 
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Vtah 2d 80 404 P.2d 
670, 673 {1965). 
The doctrine held applicable in the F.M.A. Financial 
~case is: 
often said to have originated w1th the 
decision by the House of Lords in Foakes v. Beer, 
9 App. Cas. 60S (1884), to the effect that an 
agreement by a [credi~or] ~o recei·:e 3 sum 
less than the debt owed hi~ in full satisfact1on 
of such debt is :1ot SL:ppor~ed :..;~- c :1Sl,dera.-
tion and is ::ot b1ndl!lO on <:~e ::!:e ::..:.or, <?':P:'. 
after p3~·~ent o~ :.~e s~alle~ 3~ou~ b~· ~~~ 
debtor. 
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H. L. "Brownie" Choate, Inc. v. Southland Drilling-Co., Inc., 441 
s.W.2d 672, 675 (Tex. App. 1969). Clearly the doctrine of 
Foakes v. Beer is not applicable under the instant circumstances. 
Both the F.M.A. Financial Corp. case, and the doctrine of Foakes 
v. Beer upon which it is predicated, involve the payment of Qft 
amount less than the debt both parties agree is due and oving, an 
amount liquidated through agreement of the parties. 
Plaintiff also cited Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975). That case applied the 
same doctrine dealt with in the F.M.A. Financial Corp. case and 
is equally inapposite. Furthermore, the holding in ~dealt 
with accord, not consideration. The trial court's conclusion 
that there was an accord and satisfaction was reversed because it 
was not clear that the check was tendered in full payment, not 
because of lack of consideration. In any event, the sentence 
which follows the portion of.the case quoted by plaintiff illus-
trates that this Court does not adhere to archaic definitions of 
consideration: 
However, there may be varying circumstances 
in which the debtor is induced by the 
request of the creditor to make payment in 
some manner other than he is obligated to 
do; and if he is so induced, and thus suffers 
some legal detriment in making the payment, 
there is consideration for the promise and 
the debt is discharged. 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 1229 
(Ctah 1975). 
The two other Utah cases plaintiff cites in support of 
1ts argument are equally inapposite. Bennett v. Robinson's 
-15-
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~cal Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966) and 
Dilt.An v. ~•ex Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 296 
(1962). In the Bennett case, the question was not whether there 
waa conaideration for an accord and satisfaction, but rather 
wbether there waa an accord, or agreement, at all. The ruling, 
.nd the lanquaqe quoted in plaintiff's brief, goes only to whether 
there was an agreement between the parties. The case neither 
conaidered nor was relevant to plaintiff's present argument. 
Neither does Dillman support plaintiff's position. 
A9ain, the ruling went to whether there was an agreement between 
the parties. Involved were two separate parcels of parts. One 
parcel of parts was rejected, the other accepted and paid for by 
the debtor. The creditor contended that the claims were separable 
and that a settlement as to one parcel had no effect on the 
amount owed for the other parcel. Under those circumstances, the 
court ruled there was no accord and satisfaction because there 
was no agreement that acceptance of the check as to one parcel of 
parts related to the other parcel. That holding is in no way 
inconsistent with the summary judgment granted defendants in the 
in3tant matter. 
At several points in plaintiff's brief the uncontroverte: 
facts are mischaracterized. The most blatant is at p. 24-25 
where it is stated that "U. S. Construction paid plaintiff only 
part of what it admitted it owed, and gave plaintiff no consider-
ation whatever for the compromise of the dLsputed part of plaint:' 
claim." This is directly contrary to t!-:e uncontroverted :acts ;: 
-16-
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this case. U. s. Construction paid plaintiff amounts which u. s. 
Construction contended constituted payment in full for amounts 
owed on the subcontract. Those payments were remitted as payment 
in full. At all times u. s. Construction paid the full amount it 
admitted was due; never did it pay "only part• of what it admitted 
was due. Further, U.S. Construction did pay plaintiff some of the 
requested extra compensation. 2 
Plaintiff has further embellished its argument with 
quotations from a hornbook on commercial law and with citati~ns 
to the Utah Uniform Commercial Code. The intent is to characterize 
accord and satisfaction as blackmail. Plaintiff admits that 
those provisions are not binding under the instant transaction. 
Even so, plaintiff misstated the appropriate law under the Utah 
Uniform Commercial Code which explicitly recognizes the right to 
settle disputed claims without consideration, Utah Code Ann. 
§70A-l-107: 
Any claim or right ar~s~ng out of an alleged 
breach can be discharged in whole or in part 
without consideration of a written waiver or 
renunciation signed or delivered by the 
aggrieved party. 
The lower courts holding is fully supported by the 
uncontroverted facts and the law. 
B. EVEN ACCEPTING PLAINTIFF'S UNLIQUI-
DATED - LIQUIDATED DISTINCTION, A 
VALID CONSIDERATION EXISTED FOR AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
See eg. R 237, ex. D-14 a chPck paid to plaintiff which states 
on its face that i~ includes payment for extras. 
-17-
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Bven accepting plaintiff's artificial distinction, which 
bu nev.r been applied by this court and which is factually inappli 
Gable in this case, a valid consideration exists under the instant 
facts for an accord and satisfaction. The only question is 
wbetber there is a •sufficient" consideration to support a contra~ 
lufficient consideration is present where there is: 
Any benefit to the promissor, or loss or 
detriment to the promissee, is a sufficient 
consideration to support a simple contract. 
Williams v. Peterson, 86 Utah 526, 46 P.2d 674, 678 (1935). 
s .. also, Utah Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City v. Nelson, 38 Utah 
169, 111 P. 907 (1910). 
U. S. Construction paid amounts which it believed were 
due the plaintiff, rather than withholding payment until there 
was an agreement as to the amounts due. Plaintiff's request for 
compensation in excess of the subcontract was essentially a 
rejection of that contract and could have been so treated by U. 
s. Construction. Instead, u. S. Construction continued to pay 
compensation according to its interpretation of the contract. 
Certainly, such payments constitute a detriment to U. S. Con-
struction. 
Plaintiff received immediate payment pursuant to the 
subcontract, though plaintiff was at the same time contending 
that compensation above the subcontract amount was due. Plaintiff 
certainly benefited from that immediate payment. Further, plainti: 
has been paid or tendered over $10,000 compensation in excess of 
the original subcontract amount. U. S. Construction has paid 
not only the subcontract amount, but has in an effort to comproml' 
-18-
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plaintiff's claims, approved appropriately made claiaa. an 
numerous occasions the courts have, when faced with plaintiff•• 
argument that payment of an undisputed amount cannot act u 
consideration for an accord and satisfaction of both the diapute4 
and undisputed amount, rejected that theory. 
Illustrative is Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber CO. of C&l., 
37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951). The creditor argued there wu 
no consideration because the debtor paid only the conceded 
amount of an indebtedness. The court's response to that arguaent 
is based on sound theories of consideration: 
But that circumstance would not prevent 
an accord and satisfaction arising from 
acceptance of the conditionally offered 
remittances applicable to the entire 
demand. While there is some conflict in 
the authorities on whether the payment 
of the conceded part of the claim is a 
good accord and satisfaction if received 
in discharge of the whole • • • it is 
the majority view, as well as the 
"tendency of the later cases," to "sustain 
the discharge where there is a dispute 
as to any part of the claim made by the 
creditor, although the payment is only 
the smaller amount which was conceded by 
the debtor to be due. " 
The court went on to quote from Robertson v. Robertson, 34 Cal. 
App.2d 113, 93 P.2d 175, 178 (1939): 
The consideration for the tender and 
acceptance of each check in a less 
amount was the determination of dispute, 
and the extinction of obligation in 
relation to each monthly payment so 
made. 
Potter v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 
16,21-22 (1951). In accord, Mall Tool Co. v. Poulan, 40 So.2d 
-19-
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512 (La. App. 1949): Schnierle v. Schnierle, 33 Ohio Law Abs. 
674, 33 N.B.2d 674 (1949): and Hutchinson v. Culbertson, 161 
Pa. Super. Ct. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947). 
Put aimply, to argue the lack of consideration for 
the accord and satisfaction in this case ignores the realities 
of that concept and the uncontroverted facts. Though Plaintiff 
characterizes the transactions as commercial blackmail, it 
cannot be seriously contended to be any more so than any other 
compromiae of a claim. Plaintiff's complaint is that it sDould 
not be held to ~ accord and satisfaction because to do so will 
injure its present ability to assert claims. Such is the 
nature of contracts -- parties bargain away rights in return 
for some benefit. Here the benefit was immediate payment and 
a settlement of the dispute. Further, plaintiff has been paid or 
tendered over $10,000 in excess of the subcontract amount. Cer-
tainly, sufficient consideration exists for an accord and satis-
faction. 
III. THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS ESTABLISH 
AN ACCORD. 
Plaintiff contends that whether an employee of U.S. 
Construction was aware of the plaintiff's disagreement with the 
check endorsement form, and therefore assented to plaintiff's 
alteration, presents a genuine issue of material fact. Plain-
tiff's brief is misleading as to the uncontroverted facts on 
this point. 
A total of four checks ~ere ~endered by ~.S. Con-
struct1on to pla1nt1f~ and cashed by pla~nti~f. 
-:::J-
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o-8, D-14, D-15, and D-30). No alteration was made in the 
endorsement to the first check (R.237, ex. 0-8) and it was 
signed by Denise H. Wood, an employee of plaintiff authorized 
to sign checks. (R.236 at 53). Tendered with the first check 
was a Waiver of Lien form, releasing all claims for work 
performed through June 30, 1977. Regardless of whether the 
cashing of that check ~onstitutes an accord and satisfaction as 
to work performed before that first check, certainly plaintiff 
does not contest the validity of a signed lien waiver. See 
e.g., Holbrook v. Webster's Inc., 7 Utah 2d 148, 320 P.2d 661 
(1958); and, LeGrand Johnson Const. Co. v. Kennedy, 541 P.2d 
1038 (Utah 1975). Plaintiff waived its right to assert a lien, 
or seek additional compensation for, work performed prior to 
June 30, 1977. 
The real controversy revolves around the second, 
third and fourth checks. Plaintiff's brief mischaracterizes 
the uncontroverted facts surrounding the tender and cashing of 
those three checks. Howe, plaintiff's president, was personally 
involved in picking up and cashing each of those checks. He 
testified extensively about the procedures followed. Plaintiff's 
brief deals extensively with the possibility that Patricia 
Platts knew of plaintiff's disagreement with the clerk's restrictive 
endorsement language. The record supports no such contention. 
When Howe picked up the second check from U. S. 
Construction's office he signed the Waiver of Lien form "in 
cront of Pat [Platts]". (R. 236 at 64). Howe signed that docu-
-21-
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.ant after having interlineated changes in its substantive 
language (R.236 at 63). As to the check, dated August 9, 1977, 
lowe neither obtained, nor sought, authority to change the 
endoraement language of the check. (R. 236 at 66). In fact, 
lowe made the change to the check waiver language after having 
left the U.S. Construction office. (R.236 at 66). 
Howe handled the third check, dated September 7, 
1977, in a similar manner. Again, Howe neither sought nor 
obtained authority to change the endorsement on the check. (R. 
236 at 70). Similarly, on the fourth check, dated October 11, 
1977 Howe neither sought nor obtained authorization to change 
the endorsement on the check. (R. 236 at 92-93). Howe followed 
the same procedure with both those checks as with the first, 
making the changes after having left u. S. Construction's 
office. (R.236 at 70,94). 
The uncontroverted facts before the trial court, and 
before this court, conclusively establish that plaintiff's 
disagreement with the endorsement language on the check was never 
brought to U. S. Construction's attention. Instead, in every 
case Howe would take the check and interlineated changes to the 
check endorsement form only after having left the U. S. Construct:: 
office. No expression of dissatisfaction with the check endorse-
ment was ever made by Howe. Plaintiffs reliance upon Howe's 
changes to the Waiver of Lien form are misplaced; u. S. Con-
struction places no reliance upon the Walver of Lien forms af~er 
-22-
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the first one, which was signed in an unaltered form. Plaintiff'• 
objections to the Waiver of Lien forms are irrelevant to the 
endorsement language on the checks. 
Essentially, plaintiff seeks to protect its interest 
through having made, unilaterally and in secret, interlineation• 
to the check endorsement form. This it clearly cannot do. As 
stated in Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 
186, 417 P. 2d 761, 764 (1966): 
We have no disagreement with the proposi-
tion generally that where there is a 
dispute about a claim and one party 
makes an offer of settlement which is 
accepted and performed by the other that 
constitutes an accord and satisfaction. 
The required "meeting of minds", which plaintiff contends is 
lacking, is merely the acceptance and performance of the accord: 
A subjective "meeting of the minds" is 
not required, as the creditors accept-
ance of the check may be evidenced 
actually or by implication. (Citations 
omitted) Further, it is almost uni-
versally held that "[t) he cashing of the 
check or its certification is sufficient 
in act of dominion to constitute such 
acceptance." 
Teledyne Mid-American Corp. v. HOH Corp., 486 F.2d 987, 993, 
(9th Cir. 1973). 
In each instance, Plaintiff retained and immediately 
cashed the conditionally tendered check. Plaintiff's acceptance 
of the checks as payment in full is evidenced by Howe's cashing 
of the checks with knowledge of the terms accompanying the 
check; altering those terms without notice to U. S. Construction 
:.:; of no effect, Vance •;. Hammer, 105 Ariz. 317, 464 P.2d 340, 
-23-
......... 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Upon analysis, however, these cases hold that 
vhere a payment of a particular amount is 
offered as payment in full, it can only be 
accepted according to the terms under which 
it ia offered. The offeree cannot change the 
term& of the otter by disregarding or changing 
the language of the instrument of payment. 
!!! !!!2• Reatatement of Contracts S420 (1932); Hutchinson v. 
CUlbertaon, 161 Pa. Super. 519, 55 A.2d 567 (1947); Potter v. 
Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951): 
and, Novack v. Casual Craft, Inc., 88 N.E. 2d 334, 336 (Ill. 
1949). 
The supposedly disputed facts plaintiff cites at page 33 
ot its brief are irrelevant. U. S. Construction tendered checks 
conditioned on acceptance as full payment. Plaintiff did not 
object to the terms of endorsement, nor obtain authority to change 
those terms, from any U. s. Construction employee. 
Plaintiff cites no case that U. s. Construction would 
be on constructive notice of the altered terms of the endorsement 
after the first check was altered. Plaintiff does not cite any 
cases for the proposition that where endorsement terms are altered 
without a debtors knowledge that alteration will be binding on the 
debtor. The accord and satisfaction was complete upon plaintiff's 
acceptance of the terms of the offer by cashing the checks. 3 
Plaintiff's citation of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code 
will not be dealt with in detail. Suffice it to sav that 
presumed reasonable time goes only to the ability of 3. depositor 
to assert cla1ms against its bank and was certainly not meant to 
express any un1form legislati'.·e ir1tent 3.S to reasonable time. 
By plaintiff's own admiss1.on that sect1.on does :10t gc•:ern th<= 
instant fact. 
-24-
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IV. THE CONDITION ON WHICH THE CHECKS 
WERE TENDERED IS CLEAR AND UNMIS-
TAKABLE. 
Plaintiff extensively cites case law for the proposi-
tion that the terms of an accord must be clear and unmistakable 
on the check. Defendants have no dispute with that general 
proposition. 
The endorsement on the checks involved in this case is 
unmistakably clear: 
Endorsement of this check acknowledges 
payment in full for all labor and/or 
materials and/or equipment furnished to 
date by payee and any subcontractors 
thereof toward construction and improve-
ments on the property described on the 
face of this instrument and the under-
signed hereby waives all lien rights in 
respect to such labor and/or materials 
and/or equipment heretofore performed or 
furnished, and the undersigned payee 
further acknowledges and guarantees that 
this payment is in full satisfaction of 
all labor, laborers and suppliers of 
labor and/or materials of said premises 
performed prior to this date and shall 
hold the payor harmless against any 
claims for labor or materials so fur-
nished. Payee further acknowledges and 
warrants that the labor or material for 
which payment is received hereby was 
actually performed or furnished by the 
person or persons receiving payment 
therefore. 
This instrument may not be negotiated 
until dated and signed by payee(s). 
(R. 237, Exhibit D-8). It is hard to imagine how it could be 
made more clear to a creditor that by signing the check it is 
'.-Jai ving all claims and accepting that check as full payment. 
?laintiff's ~resident apparently found the language clear 
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enou9h that he felt compelled to alter the language to protect 
plaintiff'• intere•ts. 
The endorsement on the U. s. Construction checks 
con•titute• exactly the type of "unmistakable communication" 
which the Utah court has required. Each check contained not 
only the above language, but also typed terms on its face. 
Thouqh the plaintiff characterizes those typed terms as con-
fusing, it is clear that those terms state exactly what the 
check constitutes payment for. (See eg. R. 237, ex. D-7, Dl4, 
~15 and D-30). 
Where, as here, a check is clearly tendered as payment 
in full of all claims these terms are inconsistent with retention 
under any other circumstance. Where the condition is clear, a 
creditor's options are clear: the check must be accepted as 
full payment or returned. Potter v. Pac. Coast Lumber Co. of 
Cal., 37 C.2d 592, 234 P.2d 16 (1951). As stated in Grindstaff v. 
North Richland Hills Corp,. 343 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Tex. App. 
1961). "The acceptance would be tortious unless the debtor's 
terms are assented to, and the creditor is not allowed to 
assert that he is a tort-feasor, when his acceptance can be 
given an effect involving no legal wrong." Plaintiff should 
not, by arguing the need for technical language in the endorse-
ment, be able to benefit from dealing with the check in a 
manner directly contrary to the endorsement thereon. 
Plaintiff's argument is not really that the check 
endorsement is unclear, but that particular lanouage .. ,as not 
-26-
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used. The argument seeks to impose technical language as a 
prerequisite to an accord and satisfaction. To impose such 
artificial requirements is inconsistent with the purpose of 
that doctrine and has not been applied by this Court. 
Illustrative is Reliable Fum. Co. v. American Rome 
Assur. Co., 24 Utah 2d 93, 466 P.2d 368 (1970) where the check 
tendered in settlement of a claim was marked simply •payment in 
full." The trial court had granted the debtor's motion for a 
directed verdict and that judgment was affirmed by this Court. 
No rigid rule was applied to the endorsement language. Instead, 
the totality of the circumstances were examined: 
We note our accord with the cases cited and 
relied upon by plaintiff to the effect that 
the fact that there was a notation of "pay-
ment in full" on the check does not necessarily 
settle the obligations between the parties. 
This is true in curcumstances where that does 
not appear to be the fact. However, it is 
one of the factors to be considered in the 
total picture. 
Reliable Furn. Co. v. American Home Assur. Co., 24 Utah 2d 93, 
466 P. 2d 368, 370 (1970). The "total picture" under the uncon-
troverted facts in this case is that not only was the clerk 
clearly tendered as payment in full, but that Howe so understood 
the endorsement and therefore unilaterally changed the endorse-
ment. 
Plaintiff cites Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 
P.2d 202 (1968) and Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 
560 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1977) for the proposition that for a check 
endorsement to be effective in an accord and satisfaction it must 
-27-
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contain language stating not only that it is tendered in full 
par-ent, but also that if it is not so accepted it should be 
returned. 
Moreover, for the reasons stated above, such a technical 
rule should not be applied. Furthermore, both of those cases are 
distinguishable. The Hintze case involved payment to a salesman 
of ca.missions. The court examined not only the endorsement 
language but also other circumstances involving the tender of the 
check. The authorities cited in Hintze stand only for the require· 
mant that it be clear that the check is tendered as full payment: 
In 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Accord and Satisfaction 
SlS, it is said: •.. 
"In order that the acceptance of the 
check or remittance shall operate as a full 
discharge, the condition that it is to be 
accepted in full satisfaction of the pending 
claim or obligation must be expressly made." 
In Hudson v. Yonkers Fruit Co., a New York 
Court of Appeals case, found at 258 N.Y., 
168, 179 N.E. 373, 80 ALR 1052, it is said: 
Two forms of accord and satisfaction of 
unliquidated claims are to be discovered in 
the books . . . The other is where the tender 
of the payment has been coupled with a condi-
tion whereby the use of the money will be 
wrongful if the condition is ignored. 
Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202, 207 (1968). Any 
requirement of particular language in the Hintze case should be 
attributed to the facts before the court. 
The holding in the Cannon case was that the credi~ors 
were unaware of any dispute when the checks were received. That 
holding was merely that the endorsement dld not put the c~editor 
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on notice of any dispute. There was no similar confusion as to 
the existence of a dispute or as to the terms under which the 
instant checks were tendered. 
V. PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM ADDITIONAL 
COMPENSATION BY THE CONTRACT TERMS AND 
ITS FAILURE TO COMPLY TBERENITB. 
Plaintiff's Count II alleges that "Pursuant to its 
contract with u.s. Construction, Inc., together with extras, 
plaintiff performed labor and furnished materials in the amount 
of $128,302.42 of which amount U. s. Construction, Inc. has paid 
only $52,292.00 leaving a balance due of $75,010.42." The 
subcontract provides for compensation of only $53,372.00. Though 
the Complaint states that the additional compensation is for 
extras, the invoices submitted by plaintiff make it clear that 
the real dispute centers on interference from other trades. 
Under the subcontract, plaintiff was to erect a Butler building. 
Plaintiff did no more than was required under this subcontract, 
the erection of a Butler building, and therefore performed no 
"extra" work: 
Extra work as used in connection with a 
building contract means work arising outside 
of and entirely independent of the contract 
something not required in its performance, 
not contemplated by the parties, and not 
controlled by the contract. 
C.F. Bolster Co. v. J. c. Bospflug Const. Co., 167 C.A. 2d 143, 
334 P.2d 247, 252 (1959). 
The subcontract provision dealing with extra work 
states that: 
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Section 4 •••• Any increase or decrease 
In the sUbcontract price resulting from such 
changes shall be agreed upon in writing by 
the parties hereto. No increase or decrease 
in the Subcontract price shall be binding 
on the contractor unless agreed upon in 
writing. 
Contract provision limiting the right to recovery for extra work 
or interference are valid in Utah. Western Eng., Inc. v. Utah, 
20 Utah 2d 294, 437 P.2d 216 (1968): and, Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints v. Hartford Ace. Indem. Co., 98 Utah 297, 95 
P.2d 736 (1939). Plaintiff never received approval in advance 
for extra work for which the agreed compensation has not been 
paid or tendered. (R.236 at 51). The subcontract terms do not 
provide that the subcontractor is entitled to extra compensation 
for extra work to the extent that the Contractor is entitled to 
additional compensation from the Owner. The General Conditions--
A of the u. S. Construction Wyoming Mineral Contract are there-
fore inapplicable to extra work. However, even assuming that the 
provision quoted by Plaintiff from the General Conditions - A is 
applicable here, it provides plaintiff with no relief. The 
relevant portion of that provision is: 
6. (c) • Should the Owner or the Architect 
at any time make any interpretation of any of 
the contract documents, submit any additional 
drawings, refuse to approve any of the Contrac-
tors shop drawings or require any change in 
the same as a condition precedent to the 
approval thereof, or issue any other direction 
which, although not so identified by the 
Owner, is considered by the Contractor to be 
an order making a change in the work, the 
Contractor shall within five (51 davs after 
its notice of such dlrection, submit to the 
Owner a written request for the issuance of 3 
written change order. (R.23S, ex.D-521 
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Under the uncontroverted facts in the present situatiae, 
none of the invoices from plaintiff to u. S. Construction related 
to items which had taken place within five days. Under such 
circumstances, it would have been impossible for u. s. Construction 
to have transmitted the request for written change orders to the 
owner within the requisite five days under section 6(c) of the 
General Conditions - A. 
Plaintiff's argument for compensation for interference 
from other trades is similarly forclosed. First, its Complaint 
seeks compensation for extras, not for interference. Second, 
Paragraph 6 of the subcontract provides that the subcontractor is 
entitled to compensation only to the extent to which U. S. Con-
struction is entitled compensation from the owner. For U. S. 
Construction to receive compensation from the OWner it must 
comply with Section 9(a) of the General Conditions--A to the 
u. s. Construction/Wyoming Mineral Contract. (R.238, ex. D-52). 
None of the invoices from plaintiff to U. s. Construction related 
to items performed within five days thereof. (R.237, ex. D-9, D-
10, D-11, D-12, D-22, D-23 and D-24). Each of those invoices 
were submitted more than five days after the interference to 
which it related. Under such circumstances, each of plaintiff's 
claims were, in effect, stale when made and U. S. Construction 
would not be able to comply with the terms of its contract with 
Wyoming Mineral. u. s. Construction was entitled to no compensa-
tion and therefore, under the applicable contract provisions 
cited by plaintiff, neither was plaintiff. 
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VI. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
IS UNWARRANTED UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Plaintiff's Count VI alleges unjust enrichment against 
all defendants. Plaintiff does not dispute the validity of the 
aubcontract entered with u. s. Construction. That subcontract 
provides the performance required and the manner in which addi-
tional labor will be compensated, if at all. Defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment on that count under the uncontro-
verted facts. 
The one uncontroverted fact which compels that conclu-
sion is that plaintiff entered a contract to construct a Butler 
building and in that contract was contained all information 
necessary to fully inform plaintiff of the performance required. 
Plaintiff did no more than to construct the Butler building. 
Plaintiff may not now seek recovery outside of its lawful, 
binding contract. 
The terms of the subcontract between U. S. Construction 
and the plaintiff are clear, calling for the construction of one 
Butler building, setting out certain of the components involved 
and incorporating by reference all of the plans and specifications 
of the prime contract between U. S. Construction and Wyoming 
Mineral. Where the contract terms are clear no further evidence 
is necessary, as was recognized in Jaye Smith Const. v. Bd. of 
Ed., Granite School Dist. 560 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1977) 
The contract was clear and unambiguous, and 
the court should not have permitted any 
evidence of what the intentions of plaintiff 
were when it made its bid. The material 
thing is what did the parties intend when 
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they signed the contract? The answer to that 
is clear -- they intended that plaintiff 
construct the building according to the plans 
and specifications and for the defendant to 
pay the sum of $164,022.00. 
Plaintiff seeks to circumvent the clear obligation created by the 
subcontract through the equitable action of unjust enrichment. 
There is, however, no equity in attempting to avoid one's lawful 
obligation through an action in unjust enrichment. 
This was recognized in the Jaye Smith case where the 
plaintiff was a contractor who had submitted a bid to the defendant. 
Included in the envelope containing the bid was a note qualifying, 
on a certain contingency, the terms of the bid. This qualifying 
note went unnoticed when the contract was awarded to plaintiff as 
the low bidder. This court quoted language from the testimony of 
the president of the construction company to the effect that he 
had read the contract and understood its terms. Similarly, the 
pres~dent of plaintiff in the instant action read and understood 
the terms of the subcontract. (R.236 at 33-38). The Jaye Smith 
case has its analog under the facts of the instant case. The Utah 
Supreme Court's answer to the contractor's claim of unjust en-
richment in Jaye Smith is therefore particularly cogent: 
Since when have courts rewritten contracts in 
order to enhance the profits of one of the 
parties thereto or to prevent loss to the 
other? There is no unjust enrichment to one 
who compels the other part to live up to his 
agreement. (560 P.2d at 323). 
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a.. also, commercial Fixtures ' Furnishings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 
P.24 773, 774 (Utah 1977) (". when an express agreement 
exists one may not be implied.") 
Those cases are consistent with well-settled principles 
of contract law that unjust enrichment does not allow plaintiff to 
recover in excess of its contract. See eg., SA Corbin on Contracts, 
Slll4. This rule is set out in the Restatement of Restitution, 
Sl07 (1936): 
(1) A person of full capacity who, pur-
suant to a contract with another, has performed 
services or transferred property to the other 
or otherwise has conferred a benefit upon him, 
is not entitled to compensation therefore other 
than in accordance with the terms of such bargain, 
unless the transaction is rescinded for fraud, 
mistake, duress, undue influence or illegality, 
or unless the other has failed to perform his part 
of the bargain. 
Recovery in excess of its contract is what plaintiff here seeks. 
The Jaye Smith case is, however, the answer to plaintiff's 
contention. Unjust enrichment is not an appropriate remedy where 
the parties have voluntarily sought to govern their relationship 
with a contract. 
VII. ADDITIONAL GROUNDS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The lower court's grant of judgment to defendants was 
based on extensive memoranda from both the defendants and the 
plaintiff. Defendants argued for judgment on each count on 
several bases. Each such bases must be presumed to be a ground 
for the lower court's judgment. See eg., Green lhtc!l ;·,'ater Co. '-'· 
Salt Lake Citv, 15 Cta!l 2d 2:24, 390 P.2d ~36 .l'lG-l'i. PLl::.ntl:':'s 
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brief to this Court has not challenged several of those theories. 
Defendants will briefly restate those which plaintiff has over-
looked. 
A. Foreclosure of Mechanics Lien 
As to Count I, (foreclosure of mechanics lien) Wyoming 
Mineral is entitled to judgment because the lien is restricted to 
the amount of the subcontract, and payment of all sums due under 
the subcontract have been paid or tendered. 
Plaintiff is a subcontractor of U.S. Construction. 
That subcontract provides that plaintiff was to receive $53,372.00 
as compensation for the erection of a building. The subcontract 
prLce was subject to increase only pursuant to the subcontract 
terms and those terms were not complied with in requesting addi-
tional compensation. The subcontract price has been paid or 
tendered. 
This Court's interpretation of the mechanic's lien 
statute establishes that a subcontractor may not increase the 
compensation to which it is entitled through the filing of a 
mechanic's lien in excess of the amount provided for in its 
subcontract. In Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 24 Utah 
131, 138, 66 ?. 779 (1901), the court held that "[The legisla-
ture's] intention was to secure in such cases to a subcontractor 
under a subcontract made in good faith a lien for the subcontract 
price, within the limit of the original contract price." 
B. Interference with Plaintiff's Work 
Finally, judgment on Count V (interference with plain-
~:~~·s work) ln favor of Wyoming Mineral and Jacobs Engineering 
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waa proper. Plaintiff contracted only with u.s. Construction. 
(a.237, ex. D-6). In its brief plaintiff states that Count Vis 
a breach of contract action against Wyoming Mineral and Jacobs 
Jnqineerinq. (Brief of Appellant, p.S). Plaintiff's brief does 
not, however, go on to explain how a person can allege breach of 
contract by parties with whom it has no contract. Under the 
uncontroverted facts, where plaintiff has a contract with neither 
~ominq Mineral nor u.s. Construction, judgment against plaintiff 
on its Count V was proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The grant of summary judgment for all defendants on 
Counts I, II, IV, V and VI was proper based on the uncontroverted 
facts before the lower court. The accord and satisfaction found 
by the lower court was based upon a sufficient consideration. 
The "factual" issues which plaintiff presses in its brief are 
either irrelevant under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction 
or directly contrary to the uncontroverted facts in this case. 
The lower court's judgment is also appropriately based 
on the subcontract. Plaintiff's claims for compensation were all 
submitted too late. Judgment for 
priate. The lower courts judgment 
equally appro-
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATI~ER 
At~orne~s for Respondent 
-9 South State Street 
Pos~ Office 9ox 11393 
Sal~ La%e ~it~. ~:ah 241~7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of May, 1979, 
I delivered two true and correct copies of the foreqoinq 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Peter W. Billings, Warren Patten and 
Charles B. Casper, of and for Fabian & Clendenin, rneys 
for Appellant, 800 
Utah, 84101. 
-37-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
